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Towards an alternative approach to modelling in school mathematics 
Uwe Schürmann1 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Germany 
 
ABSTRACT: This article analyses the philosophical underpinnings of mathematical 
modelling with the focus on the modelling cycles in mainstream mathematics education. 
Due to its background of epistemological representation, the main focus is set on Kantian 
philosophy. I argue that representational thinking leads to a problematic view on 
mathematics and its relation to reality. Finally, I outline an alternative approach to 
mathematical modelling according to Deleuze’s differential ontology. 
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Introduction 
Let’s start with a story. In the 1930s, two cartographers, Otto G. Lindberg and Ernest 
Alpers, marked a spot on a map called Agloe published by Esso (now Exxon). However, 
Agloe was not a real place such as a street, a town, a lake, or a river. It was an anagram of 
the initials of the two cartographers that should function as a copyright trap. This was and 
is a very common way to ensure that no other company can easily copy a map they have 
not fabricated themselves. This works as follows: Imagine all the work necessary to 
design a new map. So, in case that cartographers see their fake place on a different map it 
is evidence that such map must be a pirate copy. Even today, cartographers like Google 
or Apple use the same kind of trap. For example, on Google maps, there used to be the 
non-existing place Argleton which was removed after it had been discovered.  
So what happened to Agloe? It appeared on a map of Esso’s business rival Rand 
McNally. Consequently, Esso threatened to sue them. But interestingly, a store named 
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Agloe General Store had been built on the spot where Agloe was marked on Esso’s map. 
This means that Agloe had become a real place and therefore no copyright infringement 
could be established. The store was closed down in the 1990s and Agloe practically 
seemed to disappear as easily as it had been established. Nevertheless, the story was not 
over yet: Agloe had been assigned a key role in the novel Paper Towns written by John 
Green. A ‘paper town’ is an alternate name for those copyright traps, i.e. towns that only 
exsist on paper. One of the main characters of the book, a girl called Margo, runs away 
from home and hides herself in Agloe. The title of the book, Paper Towns, alludes to 
several so-called paper towns that Margo discovers while running away. Nowadays, it 
happens that fans of the book or of the later film adoption go on a pilgrimage to Agloe. 
The place has become, so to say, a cultural site. Just have a look at Google Maps and you 
will see all the recommendations by fans of the book. 
Modelling cycles in mainstream mathematics education 
Even though “there does not exist a homogeneous understanding of modelling and its 
epistemological backgrounds within the international discussion on modelling” (Kaiser & 
Sriraman 2006, p. 302), several epistemological assumptions about modelling are widely 
shared and accepted among researchers focusing on modelling in mathematics education. 
In alliance to these shared assumptions, this article focuses on what can be called the 
mathematical modelling in mainstream mathematics education. This understanding of 
mathematical modelling in mainstream mathematics education will now be outlined. 
Against the background of the international debate on modelling in school 
mathematics, it is remarkable that “authors and researchers, as an aid to understand 
student behaviours, often represent the modelling process as a cyclic activity” (Haines 
2009, p. 146). For example, PISA2 (OECD 2009) includes the following conception in its 
mathematical framework (see figure 1). There, a cyclic structure is assumed; likewise 
reality and mathematics are represented as two separated 'worlds'. Following this point of 
view, mathematical modelling has to be considered as a process which organises real 
world problems according to (pre-established) mathematical concepts. 
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Fig. 1  Modelling cycle used in PISA’s theoretical framework (OECD 2009, p. 105) 
 
In the introduction of the 14th ICMI3 study on modelling and applications (Blum, 
Galbraith, Henn, & Niss 2007), a basic modelling cycle is shown. It also distinguishes 
between “mathematics” and an “extra-mathematical world”. Additionally, many more 
modelling cycles can be found in the ICTMA4 proceedings. Figure 2 shows the modelling 
cycle designed by Blum and Leiß (2006). It was presented at the ICTMA 12 Conference 
as well as at the CERME54. This cycle is probably the most cited one in German 
mathematics education research and is well known in the international debate as well. It 
is, for example, used in several contributions to the ICTMA proceedings (e.g. Biccard & 
Wessels 2011, Zöttl, Ufer & Reiss 2011, Vos 2013). 
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Fig. 2  Modelling cycle by Blum and Leiß (2006) 
 
Figure 2 shows a modification of Blum’s modelling cycle which was already 
published in 1988 (see figure 3). The current modelling cycle of Blum and Leiß has been 
modified by several authors. For example, Greefrath (2011) modified Blum’s and Leiß’s 
modelling cycle by adding a distinct phase for using technology, Saeki and Matsuzaki 
(2013) modified the cycle by inventing a dual modelling cyclic framework, and Ludwig 
and Reit (2013) modified the cycle by adding particular modelling competencies to any 
single step. Beside these modifications, other authors use quite a similar cyclic structure 
in their descriptions of modelling processes (e.g. Kaiser 1996, Kaiser & Stender 2013, 
Henn 2011, Girnat & Eichler 2011).  
 
 
Fig. 3  Modelling cycle by Blum (1988, p. 278) 
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Quite often, these so-called modelling cycles strengthen the belief that 
mathematics is separated from reality or at least the rest of the world. This kind of 
separation can be found in nearly every modelling cycle. Indicated by arrows, modelling 
is described as a process of translation or mapping between distinct epistemic levels, i.e. 
modelling in mainstream mathematics education is embedded in a tradition of 
representation within history of philosophy. Moreover, objects in reality and concepts in 
mathematics both are described as distinguishable identities. Additionally, an identitarian 
subject is assumed within the modelling cycle which is the author of any translation 
between two epistemic levels. Later on, I argue how this kind of identitarian thinking is 
an outcome of philosophy’s tradition of representational thinking. 
Critique on mathematical modelling in mainstream mathematics education 
In the past, on an empirical level, some of the assumptions related to modelling cycles in 
mainstream mathematics education have already been challenged. For example, by 
analysing the work of students engaged in solving so called realistic Fermi problems, 
Ärlebäck (2009) questions the cyclic structure of the modelling process assumed by 
Blum. Frejd and Bergsten (2016) interviewed scientists who are professional modellers. 
In the cause of the analysis of their interviews, they identified a gap between modelling in 
schools and the outside world. This finding led them to claim that descriptions of the 
modelling process in mathematics education are inadequate compared to the work done 
by expert modellers in real life situations. Biehler, Kortemeyer, and Schaper (2015) 
analysed students’ processes of solving problems in engineering courses. According to 
their study, the separation between mathematics and the “rest of the world” as well as the 
division into two separate phases (setting up the model, mathematical solution), as the 
modelling cycle suggests it, are inadequate. 
From a more theoretical perspective, Jablonka (2007) argues that it is hard to 
identify what is called ‘modelling competencies’ in case that the diversity of contexts is 
taken seriously. More likely, a variety of practices which do not have much in common is 
meant by the construct ‘mathematical modelling’. 
 
 
 
  TME, vol. 15, nos. 1&2, p. 233 
Aim of this article 
This article challenges the modelling cycle, including its underlying assumptions, from a 
philosophical perspective. With the Agloe story in mind, I outline the discussion on 
modelling in mainstream mathematics education driven by epistemological assumptions 
well known from philosophy, especially from Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) 
epistemology. I further argue that these underpinnings are problematic to some extent and 
hence advocate for an alternative approach to mathematical modelling based on Gille 
Deleuze’s (1925–1995) works. 
Below, modelling cycles are taken as a paradigmatic example to illustrate that 
modelling is embedded in the tradition of scientific representation as well as, to some 
extent, driven by Kant’s epistemological philosophy. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned 
that not all descriptions of modelling processes can be classified as Kantian. Azarello, 
Pezzi and Robutti (2007, p. 130), for example, emphasize the social construction of 
knowledge and the semiotic mediation provided by cultural artefacts; they describe their 
general framework as Vygotskian. Jablonka (1996) discusses approaches to mathematical 
modelling as either structural, or functional; that is, as pertaining to a philosophy of 
structure or to a philosophy of process. While the first can be considered as embedded in 
a Kantian tradition, the latter rather stresses a non-Kantian point of view. 
Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the long tradition of representational 
thinking within western philosophy, addressed and analyzed by this article, cannot be 
limited to Kant’s philosophy only (e.g. identitarian thinking, a consequence of the 
tradition of representation, can be found from Plato to Descartes and Kant). 
Modelling and the limits of representational thinking 
Scientific modelling in general and modelling in mainstream mathematics education 
belong to the long tradition within philosophy where (scientific) representation is seen as 
a relationship between scientific domains (e.g. theories) and their targets (e.g. objects in 
real-world systems or theoretical objects). The representational thought is located at the 
basis of scientific thinking in general. “Science provides us with representations of atoms 
elementary particles, polymers, populations, genetic trees, economies, rational decisions, 
aeroplanes, earthquakes, forest fires, irrigation systems, and the world’s climate. It’s 
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through these representations that we learn about the world” (Frigg & Nguyen 2016). 
Even if representational thinking is not limited to modelling only, models are pivotal to 
what is at stake in the debate on scientific representation. “As philosophers of science are 
increasingly acknowledging the importance, if not the primacy, of scientific models as 
representational units of science, it’s important to stress that how they represent plays a 
fundamental role in how we are to answer other questions in the philosophy of science” 
(ibid.). In agreement to this argument, mainstream mathematics education emphasizes the 
representational character of models. For example, Niss (2015, p. 67) describes the 
classical purpose of (descriptive) mathematical modelling as “to capture, represent, 
understand, or analyse existing extra-mathematical phenomena, situations or domains, 
usually as a means of answering practical, intellectual or scientific questions–and solving 
related problems–pertaining to the domain under consideration.”  
Representational thinking and the modelling cycle 
Clearly, all modelling cycles belong to the representational way of thinking. This way of 
thinking is related to additional assumptions which are also inherent to modelling cycles:  
1. Epistemology vs. Ontology: Models are seen as pure epistemic vehicles 
which rather deny ontological impacts of mathematical modelling. 
2. Separation: Within the representation of a target system’s objects with the 
help of concepts of a scientific domain, a separation between both of them 
is established. Therefore, mathematics and reality have to be considered as 
being separated to some extent. Furthermore, a translating ego, the ‘I 
think’, is needed because it is the subject of the representational process of 
modelling and is likewise separated from the model’s domains ‘reality’ 
and ‘mathematics’.  
3. Identitarian thinking: Representation engenders identitarian thinking. 
Objects in reality and mathematical concepts have to be thought as 
identitarian entities such as the subject itself. 
The first aspect of modelling in school mathematics mentioned above can be 
reformulated in terms of Kant’s philosophy (Kant 1783, 1787). Kant turned general 
metaphysics, i.e. ontology, to epistemology. Kant’s so-called Copernican revolution 
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places the rational being in the centre of attention. Quite similar, the modelling cycle 
describes modelling in mathematics education as a purely epistemic relation between a 
situation or a problem in reality and the modeler, i.e. the subject of activity. 
This turn in metaphysics is in alignment with the philosopher’s distinction 
between phenomena and noumena (Kant 1787, B294–B315); the second assumption of 
representational thinking located in the discourse on modelling. While noumena are 
objects that exist independently from human perception, phenomena are objects of human 
perception and thinking. According to Kant, in principle, the domain of noumena is not 
accessible for human perception and thinking. At first sight, similar assumptions can be 
found in the discourse on modelling in school mathematics. For instance, Pollak (2011) 
uses the term “translate” which, in this case, indicates a gap between real world entities 
(noumena) and objects of individual perception (phenomena); for example, “you have an 
idealized version of the real-world situation which you translate into mathematical terms” 
(ibid.). By this means, another aspect of Kant’s epistemology is inherent to modelling 
cycles, i.e. to see mathematics not only as independent from reality but as a condition of 
experience. Kant defines mathematical propositions as derived from categories of 
thinking and pure forms of intuition, i.e. space and time. First of all, here, it seems 
impossible to assume a connection between mathematics and experience; that is because 
mathematical propositions are true without a reference to any kind of experience. In fact, 
because they are prior to a human’s experience, they entail the possibility to organize 
experience in order to generate empirical knowledge. Additionally, the separation 
between noumena and phenomena is also present in the modelling cycle in case that any 
situation model is a mental representation of a given situation. Consequently, reality or 
the things themselves are not assessable by cognition or perception. Furthermore, the 
modelling cycle gives an impression of how mathematics is perceived in the discourse on 
modelling. The modelling cycle interconnects two domains: mathematics and reality. 
There is a clear separation between mathematics and the „real world“ or, at least, between 
the mathematical world and the “extra-mathematical world”. Therefore, mathematics 
does not seem to be a part of reality but rather functions as an ocular for those who 
interpret objects in reality. Also, mathematics seems to be an epistemic vehicle rather 
than an object of ontology. To emphasize this thought, I would like to consider Kant’s 
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view on mathematics. Generalized, Kant sees propositions of mathematics as synthetic 
judgements a priori (Kant 1787, B14–B16). This means that they are prior to our empiric 
experiences and therefore constitute them. Thus, the implied separation between 
mathematics and reality is a narrative used to describe any kind of mathematical 
modelling activity. Here, it will be neither explained how a (mathematical) judgement 
can be synthetic and a priori at the same time, nor do I outline the vehement critique on 
this view on mathematics which was established with non-Euclidean geometry. Notably, 
Kant and mainstream mathematics education treat mathematics as a purely epistemic 
vehicle. Both proclaim that mathematics is separated from reality to some extent. 
In addition to mathematics and reality as two distinct domains of the modelling 
cycle, another separation occurs in the epistemological setting of mathematical 
modelling. The process of mathematical modelling requires a subject that translates 
between the two worlds and that links objects in reality to concepts in mathematics. Here, 
we should focus on another aspect of Kant’s philosophy. Kant’s epistemology tries to 
avoid pure idealistic concepts such as Plato’s world of ideas (Plato 2000, 514a–517a). 
Instead, he aims to formulate an epistemology which is maximally immanent to the 
experience of rational beings and, at the same time, free from transcendent ideas as they 
can be found in the idealistic tradition. At this point, I want to recall that the terms 
transcendent and transcendental not only sound slightly different but have an opposing 
meaning. While a transcendental idea or a concept signifies a condition of experience, a 
transcendent idea or concept is something outside of the domain of any possible 
experience. In order to describe the possibility of empirical experience, Kant postulates 
transcendental ideas. They demarcate, so to say, the border of the domain of all possible 
experience. Here, special attention should be paid to the ‘I think’ (Kant 1787, B131–
B136). To Kant, empirical experience is only possible in case that the ‘I think’ can be 
added to all of a person’s judgements. The ‘I think’ ensures the identity of a perception 
and itself is assumed to be a transcendental identity. That is why it is the very first 
condition of every kind of experience to Kant. This assumed status of the individual can 
be found in the modelling cycle as well. There, the knowing and acting individual is a 
precondition of any transition from one step to another. Within the process, the 
individual’s decisions are crucial, and the ‘I think’ is involved in every single step of the 
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modelling cycle. Conclusively, representational thinking has led to at least three 
separated epistemological levels in the modelling process; i.e. the acting subject, the 
objects in reality, and mathematics. 
Finally, one of the consequences of representational thoughts is identitarian 
thinking. The concept of representation is based on the assumption that there are identical 
concepts which resemble identical objects in reality. From this point of view, concepts 
are static objects which are isolated to some extent, can be opposed to each other, and 
stay the same over a certain period of time. Similar assertions can be made in regard to 
the subject, i.e. Kant’s ‘I think’. It is presumed that it also does not differ over time. 
Representational thinking and the Agloe story 
At first glance, a map seems to be an ideal example of representational thinking. A city 
map, for example, represents the lanes, streets, and roads in and around a city by a set of 
lines of varying widths, lengths, and colours. Even though the real properties might be 
different, the structure of the city is represented by the map. Additionally, one favour of a 
geographic map is that it represents the properties of a landscape. Nevertheless, the short 
episode of Esso’s map showing Agloe challenged the representational value of maps as 
models already. From a Kantian perspective, models are purely epistemic tools. They 
depend on concepts in a related theory, e.g. mathematics, on the one side and on any 
given situation in reality on the other side. However, several authors highlighted the 
independence of models due to the fact that models cannot easily be deducted from a 
superior theory in an easy and uncomplicated way. Sometimes, models include 
assumptions which are even incompatible with the related theory (Bartels 2005, p. 83–
107). Moreover, the debate on scientific models challenges the view on models as pure 
representations of reality. To Bailer-Jones (2002, p. 3), for example, models tend to be 
vague, sometimes inconsistent and can only focus on a few aspects of reality. So, to some 
extent, models seem to be independent from circumstances of reality.  
Nevertheless, in case that models are independent from superior theories as well 
as from reality, one would have to admit that the independence of the Esso map is in 
some respect different. Of course, to mark a place on a map which does not exist is 
incompatible to any superior geographic theory and loosens the model’s dependence 
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from circumstances in reality. Yet, this kind of independence is an epistemological one. 
Furthermore, the Agloe example illustrates how a model can be independent from an 
ontological perspective. Everything that happened in relation to the map had an 
ontological impact. The map became part of reality from the moment it had been 
published. The model/map changed the landscape, raised legal questions, and inspired 
literature. So, a map is not a tracing. 
In addition, the weakness of identitarian thinking becomes apparent in this story. 
Even though the image of representation treats all places on the map as identitarian 
concepts, Agloe itself cannot be considered as such. Agloe has no traceable and defined 
territory; it is out of scale. Moreover, Agloe’s entire identity remained undefined. At first, 
Agloe was a paper town which then became real; or put differently, Agloe had a quite 
fuzzy ontological status. It existed and did not exist at the same time. While the two 
cartographers would have denied Agloe’s existence due to the fact that they invented the 
paper town, all the customers of the Agloe General Store would assert the opposite. In the 
end, it became a desirable destination to plenty of readers of a book. The example of 
Agloe illustrates how a model can change its nature multiple times by being transferred 
from one hand to another. More precisely, the example of Agloe shows that models do 
not inherit a single nature, essence, or substance. In objection to that thought one could 
argue that all this happened accidentally and without purpose. However, that is exactly 
the point: it happened even though it was not expected. 
Towards an alternative approach to modelling in school mathematics 
For Deleuze, “the aim of philosophy is … to find the singular conditions under which 
something new is produced” (Smith & Protevi 2015). By aspiring this, he replaces the 
epistemological question on what ensures representation by the ontological question of 
becoming. In the following, it is argued that this principal turn in thinking about the aim 
of philosophy might help to reconsider mathematical modelling in school and in 
educational research. As it has been emphasized already, representational thinking goes 
hand in hand with identitarian thinking. Deleuze challenges this way of thinking by 
investigating what he calls ‘difference in itself’, i.e. an inner principle of reality, prior to 
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identities. Together with the turn from epistemology to ontology, his project can be 
described as ‘ontology of difference’. 
It is important to note that Deleuze applies mathematics, current mathematical 
problems of his time and history of mathematics, to develop his approach. He neither 
writes a philosophy of mathematics, nor does he do mathematics itself (for surveys on the 
use of mathematics in Deleuze thinking, see Duffy 2006). Deleuze argues that 
mathematical investigations challenge our view on reality. He uses them to illustrate that 
reality can be seen from different perspectives compared to the mainstream or, as 
Deleuze calls it, major tradition of western philosophy. Thus, the hope of mathematics 
education research is that Deleuze’s philosophy can also be used to give new insights on 
the learning of mathematics, especially on modelling processes (for an overview of the 
use of Deleuze’s philosophy in mathematics education research, see de Freitas & 
Walshaw 2016, pp. 93–120). Now, I outline some of Deleuze’s insights about 
mathematics which might be productive in order to reformulate modelling in an 
ontological, non-representational manner.  
Mathematical concepts as multiplicities 
First of all, I want to mention Deleuze’s distinction between problematic and axiomatic 
formalization in mathematics (Deleuze 2004, Deleuze & Guattari 2004). Problematic 
formalization is a minor strand in the history of mathematics or a “nomad” way of 
thinking. The axiomatic (or arithmetized) way of formalization is the major strand in the 
history of mathematics. 
Nomadic mathematics, according to Deleuze and Guattari, disrupted the regime of 
axiomatic through its emphasis on the event-nature of mathematics. In particular, nomadic 
mathematics attended to the accidents that condition the mathematical event or encounter, 
while the axiomatic attended to the deduction of properties from an essence of fundamental 
origin (de Freitas 2013, p. 583).  
The tensions between axiomatic and problematic approaches surfaced at several 
points in the history of mathematics. In a nutshell, the major trend in mathematics history 
can be characterized as a shift from solving concrete problems to deducing mathematics 
from axioms (e.g. a shift from Archimedean to Euclidean geometry); so what happened 
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was a substitution of illustrative geometry under the conditions of arithmetic and algebra 
(e.g. Desargues’ projective geometry was replaced by Fermat’s and Descartes’ analytic 
geometry). A further change was the displacement of infinite and dynamic mathematical 
events by a finite and static image of mathematics (e.g., Leibnitz and Newton interpreted 
the calculus dynamically, but due to Weierstraß’ static and finite epsilon-delta criterion 
this was not needed anymore). To Deleuze, the tension between both sides illustrates a 
general conflict line that can be found in both, western philosophy and society. 
“Deleuze’s approach is always socio-political, always showing how political and the 
mathematical are entwined” (de Freitas & Walshaw 2016, p. 95). 
To solely focus on the axiomatic side tends to be problematic in relation to 
modelling in school mathematics. Assuming, in alignment to Kant, that axiomatic 
mathematics is a condition of experience, modelling tends to be a process where real 
objects and mathematical concepts are treated as identities. Consequently, a model would 
be nothing new but another application of mathematics. 
To develop a differential ontology, Deleuze tries to grasp reality as near to the 
real objects as possible. Therefore, his aim is to develop a philosophy of pure 
immanence. He doubts that Kant’s transcendental approach is successful by indicating 
that abstract concepts like the ‘I think’ are still transcendent concepts. In opposition to 
Kant, he outlines conditions of the genesis of real experience (not necessarily possible 
experience) and the becoming of the new. His purpose is to avoid the identitarian 
thinking of western philosophy. Furthermore, he emphasizes that difference is prior to 
identity. Within major tradition of philosophy, that relationship was defined the other 
way around. Difference was thought as the difference between already divided and 
distinct concepts (A is not B). Again, Deleuze refers to mathematics, especially to the 
history of the calculus, to address this questionable definition and to show how difference 
can be a genetic principle prior to identity. In order to do so, he uses Leibniz’s geometric 
interpretation of the calculus (Leibniz 1701). There, it is shown that the differential 
relation dy/dx continues to exist and has an expressible finite quantity, even in case that 
its terms have vanished.  
The relation dy/dx is not like a fraction which is established between particular quanta in 
intuition, but neither is it a general relation between variable algebraic magnitudes or 
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quantities. Each term exists absolutely only in its relation to the other: it is no longer 
necessary, or even possible, to indicate an independent variable (Deleuze 2004, p. 219).  
It is a pure relation which is prior to the lengths dy and dx. According to Deleuze, 
this serves as an example of what he calls the concept of ‘difference in itself’. The 
differential relation is prior to the identities dy and dx and establishes them. From 
Leibniz’s point of view, the lengths dy and dx are pre-established by the differential 
relation in any given point of a curve-line.  
From this very first differential principle, the ‘difference in itself’, Deleuze 
derives several other related concepts to exemplify how the new comes into the world 
and how real experience can be generated. At first, he gives an alternative interpretation 
on what is called a singularity. Commonly, a singularity is defined in relation to a 
universal. Comparable to set theory, a concrete object is subordinated to a more general 
concept. So, the particular contrasts the universal. However, bearing the calculus in mind, 
it is now possible to rethink a singularity as an element just beside regular ones. An 
extremum of a curve-line where the differential relation dy/dx tends to be zero might 
serve as an example of a singularity beside regular points. Singularities can be interpreted 
as events (i.e. something is ‘happening’ at these points). This view on singularities as 
events in a continuum of surrounding points is very different from the ‘traditional’ 
hierarchical view on singularities as reification of a universal concept. 
Deleuze replaces universal concepts by what he calls a multiplicity. A multiplicity 
is constituted by folding or twisting particular elements like the curve-line which is 
generated by differential relations prior to its singular points. The multiplicity is an 
assemblage of regular and singular elements, but contrary to a universal concept, it is 
open in principle and therefore fluent. To be open in principle means that every 
multiplicity is interwoven with different ontological levels, e.g. politics, music, 
economics, sciences, ecology, etc. (no order is assumed here). Thus, any mathematical 
concept can be seen as a multiplicity and therefore related to various fields of experience. 
To be precise, the relations are part of the concept itself (Deleuze 2004, p. 203).  
With the concept of multiplicity in mind, it is possible to rethink some of the 
limits of representational thinking in regard to modelling processes. First of all, due to its 
relations to several fields and its openness in principle, a multiplicity is not just a concept 
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in an epistemological sense or a tool to organize our perception. It rather exists on an 
empirical level of pure immanence and tends to have a life on its own rather than being 
an identical universal concept. This is precisely what happened to the Esso map in the 
introductory story. The map was a part of the real world, so its very own character cannot 
be described adequately as a pure epistemic tool. Furthermore, to limit a problem to a 
singular field of knowledge, like static mathematics, undermines the multiplicity structure 
of the problem. Concepts that do not only apply to mathematical problems and 
propositions should not be treated in a Kantian way of thinking; i.e. as pre-established 
tools to organize our perception. In fact, the problem-oriented way of approaching 
mathematics exemplifies the possibility to generate concepts from problems in a way that 
problems lead to concepts. More precisely, concepts indicate a problem. In consequence, 
reality and mathematics should no longer be perceived as separated entities. From 
Deleuze’s perspective, mathematics is a part of reality just like anything else. About the 
application of mathematics he says that “there is no reason to question the application of 
mathematics to physics: physics is already mathematical, since the closed environments 
or chosen factors also constitute systems of geometrical co-ordinates” (Deleuze 2004, p. 
3; for a historical and philosophical analysis of the separation of mathematics and reality 
against the background of Kant’s philosophy, see Schürmann 2016). 
Conditions of real experience 
The questions on the conditions of real experience and the conditions of the new have to 
be explicated in closer detail. In Kantian thinking, the distinction between possible and 
real experience is omnipresent. Above, the philosophical question of how real experience 
is possible and how to think the becoming of the new as an open question within the 
space of possible experience is sketched. Therefore, Deleuze replaced the dichotomy of 
the possible and the real with the terms of the virtual and the actual. The virtual should 
not be confused with any kind of virtual reality and it is clearly distinguishable from the 
concept of the possible. “The virtuality of the Idea has nothing to do with possibility” 
(Deleuze 2004, p. 240). The only categories that limit Kant’s definition of the possible 
are thinking and pure forms of intuition. This makes a Minotaur, a bull-headed man, part 
of possible experience because it is thinkable. However, the space of the possible is much 
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larger than the real; therefore, the transition from the possible to the real cannot be 
described in Kantian terms. Also, the transcendental/transcendent character of the 
possible is highly problematic. The possible seems to be pre-existent to the real. “With 
the concept of possibility, in short, everything is already given; everything has already 
been conceived” (Smith 2007, p. 16). In comparison, the virtual and the actual both 
describe the real, hence, they are both moments of real experience. “The virtual is 
opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual” 
(Deleuze 2004, p. 260). The two concepts can be described by the related terms 
‘problems’ and ‘solutions’. A problem is situated within the real and an actualization is 
just one of the solutions to this problem. Always, any given actualization is surrounded 
by a halo of virtualities. In other words, the virtual signifies possible actions to a 
particular problematic situation. Real experience is described by Deleuze as a zigzag 
trajectory between virtualities and actualization.  
The virtual is the condition for real experience, but it has no identity; identities of the 
subject and the object are products of processes that resolve, integrate, or actualize (the 
three terms are synonymous for Deleuze) a differential field (Smith & Protevi 2015).  
Again, the Agloe story can exemplify this. The very first objective of 
cartographing is to successfully gain orientation in a new and undiscovered terrain. This 
problem immediately sets up a virtual space. A map can be the adequate solution for 
navigate oneself in a new terrain. Therefore, every map is a particular actualization of this 
distinct virtuality. Once actualized, every map is already surrounded by its virtual space 
and can be used, for example, to navigate, to decorate a living-room, or to wrap a 
sandwich. Of course, it can be used in a novel to describe the journey of a character. All 
of these examples are actualizations which come along with the halo of virtualities. This 
is why the process of actualization can be described as a process of a never ending 
becoming. 
Due to the fact that very different ways of actualization are thinkable, the real can 
be very different at any point. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) describe how this has led or is 
still leading to various formations within the real world. Again, it is mathematics that 
serves to describe different kinds of actualisation. Deleuze and Guattari, for example, 
describe two different kinds of space, the smooth and the striated, as parts of the real. 
  Schürmann 
	
These terms refer to Riemann’s concept of space, i.e. the (smooth) Riemannian manifold 
(Deleuze & Guattari 2004, pp. 532–534) and space as a set of points or elements which is 
comparable to Cantor’s set theory. While in the latter case the measurement of 
magnitudes, especially distances, is only possible from a global perspective, i.e. by a 
metric of the hole set, the metric for measuring a distance between two points can differ 
depending on where the points are located in the Riemannian manifold. Consequently, 
that implies that in “striated space, lines or trajectories tend to be subordinated to points: 
one goes from one point to another. In the smooth, it is the opposite: the points are 
subordinated to the trajectory” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004, p. 528). For Deleuze and 
Guattari, these different ways of mathematical thinking give an idea about what is 
happening in the socio-political space. While a striated space is, for example, used by the 
state to count, sort, and measure in order to control society by means of normalization 
and processes of in- and exclusion, the smooth space gives more opportunities of 
creativity and unpredictable events. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, these 
two spaces do not oppose each other. In fact, even if they are not of the same nature, their 
relations to each other are more complex than being the opposite of each other:  
No sooner do we note a simple opposition between the two kinds of space than we must 
indicate a much more complex difference by virtue of which the successive terms of the 
oppositions fail to coincide entirely. And no sooner have we done that than we must 
remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is 
constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly 
being reversed, returned to a smooth space (Deleuze & Guattari 2004, p. 524).  
To some extent, mapping a terrain can be seen as a way of striation. Deleuze and 
Guattari explicate that by referring to the mapping of the sea: The sea once was “a 
smooth space par excellence”, but later on “the striation of the sea was a result of 
navigation on the open water” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004, p. 529). Additionally, they 
describe a contrary way of mapping a terrain; the nomad way of navigation to exemplify 
the possibility to map or even establish a smooth space: “The variability, the polyvocality 
of directions, in an essential feature of smooth spaces … and it alters their cartography” 
(Deleuze & Guattari 2004, pp. 421–422). The nomad life always is an intermezzo, once 
reached a spot; the nomad is immediately going to leave it. That means that the nomad 
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map is spread with individual spots, but these points are subordinated to routes of 
travelling. There are no paths through given points, but the points appear and are 
established only by the trajectory itself. The roads that arise from the travelling of 
nomads are not sedimentary roads. They are fluent because they are the outcome of 
continuous moving. This gives an impression of how the socio-political space can be a 
smooth one. 
At least three different types of striation need to be considered when it comes to 
modelling in the mathematics classroom. First, the teacher observes and measures the 
individual, e.g. through tests and marks. Additionally, educational research measures the 
individual. Secondly, striation takes place by connecting certain teaching methods with 
mathematical modelling tasks. The openness of modelling tasks fits very well with 
certain open methods of teaching. Some of these open methods promote the idea that 
individuals can be observed and evaluated at different times and in different activities 
(for an example of how a classroom situation can be smooth or striated in the same 
lesson, see de Freitas & Walshaw 2016, pp. 107–118). 
While these two ways of striation mentioned so far come from the outside of the 
modelling process, the third way of striation is located on the inside of the modelling 
process itself. This way of striation is related to the epistemological assumptions 
underlying the modelling process. As discussed above, to limit a problem to a singular 
field of knowledge, like static mathematics, already undermines the multiplicity structure 
of a problem. Nowadays, there is a constant tendency to focus only on those solutions or 
actualizations of a problem which tend to be measurable. These can be subordinated to 
the conditions of pre-given mathematics concepts. 
Conclusion and Perspectives 
Deleuze’s philosophical investigations facilitate us to rethink modelling processes in a 
non-representational manner. From this point of view, mathematical concepts, and 
concepts in general, can be grasped only in relation to problems. Furthermore, there is no 
need to separate mathematics from reality. Mathematical concepts are inherent to the 
same plane of immanence as problems. Deleuze’s concept of ‘difference in itself’ elicit 
the possibility to think about concepts in a non-hierarchical way. Singularities and regular 
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points establish a multiplicity that connects very different levels of experience while it is 
always open to new and unexpected connections. 
Real experience can be grasped by the terms ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’. While the 
virtual signifies possible actions to an actual situation, the actual is one of these actions, 
i.e. a part of an already actualized virtuality. Deleuze and Guattari point out that 
actualisation rather tends to striate a space than to smooth it in many occasions. 
It has been argued that the modelling cycle is limited to representational thinking 
and thus promotes an inadequate image of both mathematics and reality. Therefore, 
perspectively, it should be replaced by another model of modelling. Deleuze and Guattari 
use the botanic rhizome as a model to describe a multiplicity; non-representational, and 
non-identitarian way of thinking. According to them, a rhizomatic structure is defined by 
several characteristics (Deleuze & Guattari 2004, pp. 7–28). Any point of a rhizome can 
be connected to another arbitrary point; the rhizome itself is a multiplicity; a rhizome 
may be broken, but could start up again; finally, a rhizome is map, not a tracing.  
What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an 
experimentation in contact with the real. … The map is open and connectable in all of its 
dimensions, it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, 
reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or social 
formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a 
political action or as a meditation (Deleuze & Guattari 2004, pp. 13–14).  
So possibly, the rhizome can serve as a model to grasp modelling processes in school. 
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